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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

Judge Breitel, with whom Judge Bergan concurred, dissented on the ground that CPLR 3216 empowered the courts to
dismiss ar action "on the merits," and the effect of the majority
opinion would be to abrogate this power. Moreover, the lower
court's dismissal with prejudice, a fortiori, holds that Noto's
claim is inferior to that of plaintiff. The logical extension of
that proposition, is that Noto cannot now reassert a claim of
title in contradiction to the prior judgment. To allow him to do
so is repugnant to any application of res judicata. Finally, the
dissent reasoned that an affirmance would not leave title to the
property unsettled, because title would be awarded to plaintiffs,
who claim legal title, while defendant's affirmative defenses would
be barred.
It is somewhat confusing why the majority chose to don
this case sui generis, a label which renders the case sterile in
precedental value. On the basis of the reported decision, the
dissent seems to have expounded the preferred view of the law.
Res Judicata: Turisdictional question can be reopened unless based
on litigated question of fact.
The scope of res judicata in questions of subject matter
jurisdiction has rarely been discussed by New York courts.
Ordinarily the issue arises only when a collateral attack is being
made on a foreign judgment, in which case full faith and credit
requires that New York employ the res judicata rule of the
foreign state.1 39 However, in a recent case, Friedman v. State,40
the judgment of the New York Court on the Judiciary 4 was
attacked as having been rendered by an improperly constituted
tribunal.
The claimant, a removed Supreme Court Justice, instituted a
suit to recover his salary. The Court of Claims, dismissed the
claim finding that the judgment of the Court on the Judiciary,
removing claimant from office, was safe from collateral attack.' 42
In so doing, the court relied on the federal court rule, 43 which
grants to every court the power to conclusively determine its own
jurisdiction, subject only to direct review. This decision has recently
been reversed by the appellate division, third department, which
allowed attack under the liberal rule of O'Donoghue v. Boies'4
139Langerman v. Langerman, 303 N.Y. 465, 473-74, 104 N.E2d 857, 861

(1952).

14029 App. Div. 2d 162, 286 N.Y.S.2d 525 (3d Dep't 1968).
1411 ; re Friedman, 12 N.Y.2d [al-[el (Court on the Judiciary 1963).
14253 Misc. 2d 455, 278 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
For a discussion
of this case, see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST.
JoHxN's L. REv. 436, 461 (1968).
143 Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371

(1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
244159 N.Y. 87, 53 N.E. 537 (1899).
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that any jurisdictional question can be reopened tnrless based solely
on a litigated question of fact.
Although the federal rule is quite restrictive on a litigant's
ability to question a jurisdictional determination, it seems that
the appellate division has unnecessarily gone to the other extreme.
A more moderate rule is the Restatement rule: "When a court
has jurisdiction over the parties and determines that it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot collaterally
attack the judgment .. . unless the policy underlying the doctrine
of res judicata is outweighed by the policy against permitting
the court to act beyond its jurisdiction." 15 This principle
would permit review of the -jurisdictional basis where the court
was one of limited jurisdiction or where the lack of jurisdiction
seemed obvious,' 46 without opening the courts to collateral attacks
on every judgment except the few based solely on issues of
fact.
Collateral Estoppel: Glaser v. Huette followed.
In Glaser v. Huette,' 47 the Court of Appeals held, that where
parties to a former suit were not adversaries, but rather cofendants, an adjudication in that suit settles nothing with respect
to the liability of the co-defendants inter se in subsequent actions.
Subsequent to Glaser, the technical requirements necessary to
interpose collateral estoppel defensively were liberalized by the
Court of Appeals. 14s More recently, the Court of Appeals has
allowed the offensive use of collateral estoppel and some doubt
has been thrown upon the continuing validity of the Glaser rule
49
by Cummings v. Dresher.1
However, cases involving joint tortfeasors have continued to apply the Glaser rule.
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This principle was

adopted in Peri v. Groves, 183 Misc. 579, 50 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1944).
'14 Other pertinent factors indicated by the Restatement include: whether
the issue was one of law or of fact; whether the issue of jurisdiction was
actually litigated; and whether there is a strong policy against the court's
exceeding its jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10(2) (1942).
147 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193, aff'g, 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374

(1st Dep't 1931). A number'of lower court rumblings have held contra.
See Thornton, Further Commeit on Collateral Estoppel, 28 BiooxLvN L.
REv. 250 (1962); The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST.
JOHN's L. Rav. 128, 152 (1967).
'8 Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 X.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S2d
9
1 (1956).
149 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271' N.Y.S2d 976 (1966).
For a
further discussion of this case, see The Quarterly Survey of New York

Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 128, 153 (1967).

